The de nition of concepts is a central problem in commonsense reasoning. Many themes in nonmonotonic reasoning concern implicit and explicit de nability. Implicit de nability in nonmonotonic logic is always relative to the context -the current theory of the world. We show that xed point equations provide a generalization of explicit de nability, which correctly captures the relativized context. Theories expressed within this logical framework provide implicit de nitions of concepts. Moreover, it is possible to derive these xed points entirely within the logic.
Introduction and Motivations
Concepts play a central role in commonsense reasoning. The classical view consists of postulating a de nition of a concept, in terms of necessary and suf-cient conditions, in which the properties used as de nientes are independent of the de niendum.
Positivists pointed out that if a concept cannot be de ned via necessary and su cient conditions it is not a scienti c concept. It turns out, however that there are concepts, like game { as noted by Wittgenstein { that do not seem to have a common core which could be characterized by a set of necessary conditions (see (G ardenfors, 1992 ) for a discussion).
On the other hand, concepts involving natural kinds like bird, lemon, etc, possess necessary but not su cient conditions. This point is stressed in prototype theory, where Eleanor Rosch is one of the main proponents (see e.g (Mervis and Rosh, 1981) ). In connection with this view on`natural kinds', (Reiter, 1987) suggests resorting to su cient conditions postulated via some linguistic pattern like`normally',`typically', or`assume by default', which appeals to the context to which the de nition is relativized. And, in fact, these linguistic patterns mirror the role of defaults; namely, a default theory hW; Di accounts for a set of classical necessary conditions W and a set of`su cient' default conditions D.
Likewise, in almost all cases reported in the literature (e.g. (McCarthy, 1980) , (Lifschitz, 1987) and (Lin and Reiter, 1994) ), solving a circumscription axiomatization (by nding an equivalent rst order theory) yields de nitions for the predicate being minimized. The circumscription axiom acts like an implicit su cient condition (just as, for Reiter, the default rules act like su cient conditions) whereby the theory is implicitly de ning the concept. Solving the circumscription amounts to nding an explicit de nition for the predicates being minimized.
The notions of implicit and explicit de nition of a predicate, with respect to a theory, are formalized in rst order logic through Beth's de nability theorem (see e.g. (Beth, 1953) ), which shows that the two notions are equivalent. Moreover, from an implicit de nition of a predicate an explicit de nition can be found by constructing an interpolant formula. An immediate consequence of Beth's theorem is that implicit de nitions in rst order logic state the uniqueness of the predicate being de ned. Therefore, for example, if we state that S`8x(raven(x) black(x)), then the only black things we can talk about in S are ravens. Whenever the context changes, for example by adding new axioms, then by the monotonicity of rst-order logic, one cannot compatibly update the de nition of the concept. Tarski discusses the connection between the notions concerned with de nability and those concerned with deduction in (Tarski, 1956 ).
On the other hand, only`well behaved' predicates are implicitly de nable; in general we may lack either su cient or necessary conditions to de ne a con-cept; in such cases no explicit de nition can be drawn. McCarthy's circumscription (McCarthy, 1980) circumvents this strong behaviour of de nability in rst order logic because the circumscription axiom is weaker than implicit de nability (see (Doyle, 1985) for a discussion). As noted above, since the explicit de nition is achieved by minimization, uniqueness is no longer a strong constraint because it is relativized to the theory on which circumscription is applied. In other words, there is no total commitment to the given de nition.
Consider, for example, the following theory T.
ontable(a) _ ontable (b) 8x red(x) ! ontable (x) (1)
The circumscription of ontable in T yields a rst-order formula because ontable is separable (see (Lifschitz, 1985) ), that is ((8xontable(x) 
where Z and Z 0 are formulae not containing ontable (see (Lifschitz, 1985) Theorem 1).
We note that in such a case we do not get an implicit de nition of ontable, as there are at least two minimal non-isomorphic models for it. Therefore we do not get an explicit de nition in Beth sense. Despite the lack of a classical explicit de nition, we have obtained a disjunction of two de nitions for the predicate ontable. The example clearly shows that circumscription is weaker than Beth's implicit de nability and we are no longer committed to uniqueness. A rst order disjunction of de nitions is a nice generalization of de nability, though it does not tell how a single explicit de nition can be obtained from weak implicit conditions. (Lin, 1996) shows that the circumscription of a theory, axiomatizing the e ects of indeterminate actions, may yield a very large disjunction of successor state axioms. To overcome this problem, Lin proposes a transformation that breaks the disjunction and yields di erent successor state axioms. The interesting contribution is that his transformation is performed by introducing a suitable predicate which is used, in a sense, to name the contexts in which the di erent e ects of the performed action are realized.
As another example of how implicit and explicit de nability enters into nonmonotonic reasoning, observe that an approach to logic programming semantics for the nonmonotonic negation-as-failure operator is the Clark completion, which treats a logic program as a set of necessary conditions and \completes" this program by adding suitable su cient conditions yielding explicit de nitions for the program predicates. (Reiter, 1982) shows how, in some cases, the Clark completion is the result of circumscribing the program.
The upshot of the foregoing discussion is that many themes in nonmonotonic reasoning concern implicit and explicit de nability. In fact there are very good computational reasons for wanting explicit de nitions, because then we can do e cient theorem proving by substitution of the de nientes for the de niendum in any theorem to be proved. However, while it seems clear how to weaken implicit de nability in nonmonotonic reasoning (via defaults or circumscription) so far there is no solution to the problem of how to get, in general, an explicit de nition from the implicit su cient conditions stated through a nonmonotonic theory. The main contribution of this paper is to show one way to solve this problem.
Returning to the above theory (1), in order to obtain one of the disjuncts disregarding the others, we should be able to express that, relative to a context C, the necessary and su cient conditions for an object to be on the table are that either it is red or it is the object a. Analogously there is a context C 0 where the object is b. The role played by contexts should be the following: each de nition in the disjunction should refer to a di erent context.
To subsume a context of reasoning (or a context of discourse) in a theory axiomatizing a certain state of a airs, we need a language that resorts to a kind of self-referential ability. That is, we need to formalize, in the language, expressions that can be reasoned about in that same language itself. A statement in which the context can be explicitly taken into account is a commonsense statement. And, in fact, commonsense reasoning naturally relies on a current state of a airs: the minimum resource of information at hand. This form of relativization to the context is often carried out by binding commonsense statements to the belief set of an agent. So the self-referential ability is lifted from the commonsense language to one in which two distinct (or even more) levels of reasoning are formulated: the one where the agent draws conclusions from the initial assumptions and the one where the conclusions drawn are compared with the context, which, in general is a metalogical structure, i.e. a computational object external to the language in which the agent is reasoning. The following de nition is, in this sense, paradigmatic:
? Cn (I f3 : : 6 2 ?g) (3) which says that if I is a nonmonotonic theory then the nonmonotonic consequences of I are obtained by taking the deductive closure { in the logic { of I, together with all the formulae consistent with ?, where 3 is, in fact, interpreted as \it is consistent to assume in ?". Although ? is a context, in the sense that it is considered to be the belief set of an agent, the above expression does not belong to the agent's language. When the above schema is used to characterize default reasoning, we have three levels of discourse.
One for the default theory, one for the translation of I, in order to be compatible with 3 , and, nally one for the equation itself. In this last case the self-referential ability is de nitely disregarded. Therefore, we cannot consider the above equation (3) as a commonsense statement, although it has many advantages like, for example, providing an embedding for default reasoning in a wide class of modal logics (see (McDermott and Doyle, 1980; McDermott, 1982; Marek and Truszczynski, 1990; Schwarz and Truszczynski, 1994; Schwarz, 1995) ).
Let us reformulate the strict relation between de nability and self-reference. As we have argued, classical de nability is too strong because it is functional, i.e. it commits to uniqueness, and this behaviour is not reasonable in the real world. Weakening implicit de nability (as nonmonotonic formalisms do) involves, in almost all cases, either a disjunction of de nitions (in the case of Circumscription) or a variety of extensions (e.g. in the case of Default) which are, in general, in nite objects not characterizable through sentences. Each disjunct or extension implicitly refers to a di erent context. Insofar as the context is not made explicit in the language, an agent does not have, in general, an appropriate sentence for representing the required necessary and su cient conditions involved in a de nition.
What we need is a sentence whose denotation depends on its context, like the denotation of the word \here" depends on the place it is uttered (Smullyan, 1994) . A well known device for naming a context is to treat it as a designator, i.e. a parameter which acquires its meaning through a suitable substitution (see (Smullyan, 1957) for a discussion on the role of substitution in these cases). For example, to express that a given sentence is consistent relative to a context C a formula of the form C^ may be provided, say ' C]. Since C occurs in ' C] as a parameter, a suitable substitution for C has to be found. The designator C is, indeed, the very sentence ' C]. Therefore the substitution for C is a sentence , in which C does not occur, such that ' ] is true. The sentence ' C] C is a xed point equation which gives us explicit de nitions for C: they are the admissible substitutions for C in ' C], established by showing that ' ] is a theorem.
More precisely, when a context is treated as a parameter in a self-referential language, nding a substitution for the context amounts to nd an explicit de nition for it. Such an explicit de nition exists only if we can prove that there are theorems of the form` ' ] , where is an appropriate logic that will be made precise in the paper.
The above considerations imply that an explicit de nition of a context re-quires a logic where xed point theorems of the form` ' ] exist for a formula ' C] in which the parameter C is suitably used as a designator. More important, the existence of such xed point theorems must be stated without resorting to the uniqueness of C, that is, without relying on an implicit de nition of C. This has been, in fact, the main e ort of this work. The connection between nonmonotonic reasoning and a logic in which xed points are characterizable, namely the modal logic G, has been early investigated by (Doyle, 1980) . The modal logic G (Boolos, 1979; Solovay, 1976) is the logic in which the notion of provability in Peano Arithmetic is interpreted. For this reason the characterization of xed points goes through implicit de nability which, as we discussed above, means that there exists a unique solution to the xed point equation; this commitment to uniqueness brings us back to the constraints of rst-order logic. The inadequacy of G for interpreting consistency and provability in nonmonotonic logic was noticed by Doyle, who also observed that both G and G { axiomatizing the notion of truth in Peano Arithmetic { \miss out on all contingent statements of provability" (Doyle, 1981) . We discuss this point in Section 4.2. On the other hand, (Gabbay, 1991) has modeled negation by failure in logic programming by means of the provability operator of the modal logic G.
Let us consider again the previous example and say that T C] is a theory in which a context C occurs as a parameter. That is, T C] is a theory in which one can represent, e.g., sentences of the form:
Then, what we want to get from T(C) are the following explicit de nitions:
Now, such sentences 1 and 2 exist if we can say that there is a logic in which, by substituting either 1 or 2 for C in T C], we get the following theorems:
We ask, furthermore, that if such xed points are expressible in the logic then the i are computable from T C] itself.
The problem is to determine the restrictions that has to be imposed so as to avoid the obvious paradoxes of a self-referential language. Both in (Perlis, 1985; Perlis, 1988) and in (Montague, 1963 ) the di culties of dealing with a rst-order self-referential language are thoroughly analyzed. In particular Montague points out the problems concerned with substitution; we discuss this point in the last section of this paper.
It is possible to circumvent the di culties arising from self reference through a modal logic; this was in fact the claim of Montague. We show that there is a suitable modal logic in which xed points of predicates are de nable, so that self-reference can be fully managed in the previously described sense. The modal approach to the problem is, therefore, just an initial way to inquire into interesting solutions. The main contribution of this paper is the introduction of a self-referential language, through modal logic, in which commonsense statements are expressible and in which explicit de nitions are obtainable via xed point equations.
More precisely, we show how one can deal with a self-referential language and that the context is, indeed, what we have in mind: in the case of a nonmonotonic theory which is implicitly de ning a concept, the context is its explicit de nition and, more generally, the context is the minimal set of formulae whose consequences are true in the theory. To show this, let us consider a default rule : = in default logic, let C be a parameter denoting the context and consider the following sentences:
(i) \ is provable w.r.t. the context C" is identi ed with 2(C ! ) (ii) \ is consistent w.r.t. the context C" is identi ed with 23(C^ ).
Observe that we use the modal operator 2 to interpret the notion of provability and the composite operator 23 to interpret the notion of consistency.
There are many logics in which consistency and provability are not dual, likewise 2 is not always the dual of 3 { just consider intuitionistic logic (Amati et al., 1996b) . Here we are manufacturing the meaning of the notions of consistency and provability in nonmonotonic logic. Since these notions are interpreted with respect to a context, they do not enjoy duality as in classical logic.
We de ne a sentence E(C) capturing (i) and (ii) and such that there exists a diagonal sentence , not containing C, that explicitly de nes C in , with the modal logic KD4Z, i.e. the modal logic built from the axiom schemata K; D; 4 and Z KD4Z E( ) (4)
The above xed point equation provides a generalization, which correctly captures the relativized context, of explicit de nability for theories expressed in this logical framework, where these theories may be used to de ne concepts. Speci cally, when we apply this result to default theories we show that, whenever hW; Di is a default theory (Reiter, 1980) Now, let hW; Di(C) be the self-referential sentence, obtained from hW; Di, by making the context C explicit, as a designator. According to the results of this paper, we will have the following sentence, along the lines of (i) and (ii) introduced above:
The technical meaning of this self-referential sentence will be made clear in the paper. Let us call E(C) the boxed sentence 2hW; Di(C). By suitably treating the parameter C it is possible to prove, using the techniques of this paper, that there are two sentences, namely 2 By adding to KD4Z the modal schema 5, the above result does no longer hold.
for i = 1; 2; where q and q 0 , in 1 and 2 , are the \consistency part" of the context, i.e. are of the form 23 , and are later eliminated by theoremhood, thus delivering i free from subformulae denoting consistency, and 1 and 2 are, respectively, substituted for C in E(C). In other words, both 1 and 2 are equivalent to C, which is obtained from the fact that both 1 and 2 are xed points of E in the modal logic KD4Z.
By mapping the formula 1 into the language of hW; Di we get,
which, in its turn, is equivalent to
Therefore we get an explicit de nition out of the default theory. Observe that the sentence we have obtained through the xed point is free from disjunctions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we give some preliminaries on the language. In Section 3 we present the modal logic KD4Z
and a tableau method to perform proofs. More details can be found in (Amati et al., 1994) and (Amati et al., 1996a) . In Section 4 we present the results on de nability of xed points in KD4Z, we discuss self-reference and xed points in modal logic, notably the relation with the provability logic G and extensions to quanti ed modal logic. In Section 5 we prove that Reiter extensions can be computed by a self-referential sentence in KD4Z and some examples are provided in Section 6. Section 7 closes the presentation with a discussion and comparison with modal approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning. Finally we add an appendix with the proofs of the main theorems. Other proofs can be found in (Amati et al., 1994) and in (Amati et al., 1996a) .
Preliminaries
We deal with propositional modal logic, we shall address the extension to rst order logic at the end of Section 4. We refer the reader to (Goldblatt, 1992) for the basics of modal logic. A propositional modal language L is de ned using a set of propositional letters whose elements are denoted p; q; : : : and a unary operator 2. The well formed formulae of the modal language are given by the rule A ::= p j ? j :A j A 1^A2 j 2A where p ranges over elements of , ? denotes a contraddiction, > a tautology and the usual classical abbreviations for disjunction and implication apply. We use both lower case Greek letters and upper case Latin letters to denote sentences and reserve the last uppercase letters of the Latin alphabet and uppercase Greek letters to denote sets. Structures are denoted by Gothic letters.
In general, if 2 is interpreted in the standard way as`necessity' then the modal context is alethic (from the Greek`true'). There are many other interpretations, like epistemic, where 2 is interpreted either as`knowledge' or`belief', or temporal, where 2 is interpreted as`always'. Other meanings of 2 are the dynamic one, that is,`true after every execution of an action', the deontic one, in which 2 means`ought to be' and nally the default one, where a suitable interpretation of 2 is`it is provable', similarly to the logic of arithmetic. This is, indeed, the intended meaning of the modal operator in this paper.
A dual operator of 2 is de ned by 3A = :2:A.
We rst introduce some basic notions on Kripke semantics for modal logic. A Kripke frame is a pair F = hW; Ri where W is a non-empty set and R is a binary relation on W. A model is a pair A = hF; Ii, where F is a frame, and I is a function assigning a subset I(p) of W to each propositional letter p. The function I is called a valuation. The notation A; w j = ' is de ned inductively:
A; w j = p i w 2 I(p) A; w j = :' i not A; w j = ' A; w j = '^ i A; w j = ' and A; w j = A; w j = 2' i for all v 2 W, with wRv, A; v j = ' If A = hW; R; Ii is a model then A; w j = A means that the formula A is true at world (point) w in the model A; A is true in a model A (A j = A) if it is true at all worlds in A. A modal formula A is valid on a frame F if A is true at every worlds of F, under every valuation.
Most of the research in commonsense reasoning dealing with knowledge, belief and self-reference takes into account normal modal logics (e.g. (McDermott, 1982; Moore, 1987; Perlis, 1988; Schwarz, 1990; Truszczynski, 1991; Stalnaker, 1993) 
niteness If S 1 ; : : : ; S n are schemata then KS 1 : : : S n is the normal modal logic generated by S 1 ; : : : ; S n . A sentence A is provable in the logic = KS 1 : : : S m , denoted A if it has a proof from K; S 1 ; : : : ; S m . That is, there is a sequence of formulae A 0 ; : : : ; A n = A, and for each i, i n, either A i is a propositional tautology or is an instance of K; S 1 ; : : : ; S m , or it has been obtained by Modus Ponens or by Necessitation. The set of theorems of coincides with the set of formulae in that have a proof from K; S 1 ; : : : ; S m .
Let F be a class of frames (or models), a normal modal logic is sound with respect to F i for all formulae ' and all A, A 2 F,` ' implies A j = '. If is sound w.r.t. F then F is said to be a class of frames (or models) for .
A normal modal logic is complete w.r.t. F i for any set of formulae ? f'g, if ? j = F ' then ?` '. Hence is said to be characterized by F. E.g. KD is characterized by the class of serial frames, S5 is characterized by the class of universal frames, i.e. R = W W.
The modal Logic KD4Z
The modal logic we are interested in is KD4Z, which is the normal modal logic extending KD4 (i.e. the normal modal logic with transitivity and seriality) with the axiom Z, discreteness:
In the sequel we show that KD4Z is indeed a good logic for self-reference in commonsense reasoning. We shall illustrate the logic and give both semantics and proof theoretic methods. The schema Z is widely discussed in (Goldblatt, 1992) , more details can be found in (Amati et al., 1994) and (Amati et al., 1996a) .
KD4Z and its semantics
We now introduce some useful notions. Given a set T of worlds, with u; v 2 T, if uRv and for no t is uRtRv then u is called predecessor of v and v successor of u. Note that both a successor or a predecessor of a world may not be unique and a re exive world has no predecessor or successor at all. A world w 2 T is called a rst element in T if it has no preceding elements.
A frame is linear or connected if for all u and v either uRv or vRu; an irre exive frame (i.e. for no u is uRu) is weakly discrete if for all worlds u and v, with uRv no in nite chains of worlds uRt 1 Rt 2 : : : Rt n R : : : Rv exist; a frame is universal if for all u and v, uRv. We recall from ) that the concatenation R 1 R 2 of two relations R 1 T T and R 2 S S is the relation R 1 (T S) R 2 .
Given two Kripke frames F 1 = hT; R 1 i and F 2 = hS; R 2 i, where T \ S = ; the Kripke frame hT S; R 1 R 2 i is called the concatenation of F 1 and F 2 and is denoted by F 1 F 2 { see .
In a frame hW; Ri a cluster is a subset V of W that is maximal with respect to the property that for all u and v from V , uRv. We say that a frame has the terminal cluster property if it is the concatenation of F 1 J F 2 where F 2 is a universal frame (compare with Condition 2 of De nition 9.17 for cluster-closed class of models ).
A frame F is said to be well{capped or to have the nite depth property if no ascending chain of worlds w 1 R : : : Rw n Rw n+1 : : : exists. A frame F is said to be of depth n if no n + 1{chain of worlds w 1 R : : : Rw n Rw n+1 exists.
The following theorem gives the characterizations of KD4Z.
Theorem 1 (Amati et al., 1996a) KD4Z is complete with respect to each of the following:
{ the class G fin of nite models whose frames are F J V , where F is transitive, irre exive with a rst element and V is a cluster.
{ the class G of models whose frames are F J V , where F is transitive, irre exive, well{capped and V is a cluster.
{ the class G of models whose frames are F J V , where F is transitive, irre exive, well{capped, V is isomorphic to h!; <i.
The decidability of KD4Z follows from the above theorem.
By adding the linearity axiom L to KD4Z we have that KD4LZ is complete with respect to the class B of balloons (Goldblatt, 1992) , where the frames are the results of the concatenation of nite, linear, irre exive and with a rst element frames with a terminal cluster. KD4LZ is also complete with respect to the frame of \integers" h!; <i.
Note that a frame with no ascending chain is not necessarily nite: in fact a world w may have an in nite number of successors (or predecessors) w i , i < , where is any cardinal. The set of all successors of a world is called a pseudo-cluster. We introduce in the following semantic tableaux for the logic KD4Z, a proofmethod useful when dealing with examples involving some derivation in the logic.
Semantic tableaux are used as refutation systems. They are built by means of a set of rules that preserve satis ability of sets of formulae. We make use of the signed version of modal tableaux given in (Fitting, 1983) . A formula ' is signed if it is presented in the form T' or F', where the pre xes T and F intuitively refer to true and false.
Each world in a KD4Z model hF; R; Ii can \see" a world belonging to the terminal cluster V and, as tableaux build a countermodel, we have to be able to end up in the cluster, whichever path we are following, after a given number of steps.
In the following the possible-force formulae are signed formulae of the form T3 , F2 , and the necessity-force formulae are signed formulae of the form T2 , F3 .
Modal expansion rules are stated as follows, where set union is brie y denoted by the comma, in the obvious sense. has a KD4Z-tableau proof.
The above theorems have fairly classical proofs along the lines of (Fitting, 1983) ; in particular, completeness exploits both ltration and the construction of a generated model. For details see (Amati et al., 1994 ).
Self Reference in Modal Logic
In the following we give the technical details on the de nability of xed points in the modal logic KD4Z; we shall discuss this result and compare it with those established in provability logic G in next section. We shall also address the problem of extensions to quanti ed modal logic. 
By suitably modifying some of the proofs reported in (Smorynski, 1985) , we are able to prove that any implicit consistency predicate is de nable in KD4Z. Furthermore, for a predicate of the form 2C(p) we are able to characterize, up to logical equivalences, all xed points in KD4Z.
Theorem 4 (Definability of predicates of the form 2C(p)) Let E(p) = 2C(p), with E(p) an implicit consistency predicate. Then 2C(>)
is a xed point. That is,`K D4Z 2C(>) 2C(2C(>))
The above theorem, whose proof is in the Appendix, states the existence of consistent solutions. That is, any implicit consistency predicate has a xed point. The above Condition (9), is essential to weaken implicit de nability.
In other words, the e ect of this condition in the logic KD4Z is to withdraw uniqueness of xed points (see the discussion in next section). It is also worth noting that elements in may be orthogonal that is:`K D4Z :(A 1Â 2 ) and A 1 ; A 2 2 .
4.2 A discussion on Provability, Consistency and the logic G There is a well established area of pure logic where modalities have been used to interpret the notions of \provable" and \consistent" in PA, the rst order Peano Arithmetic (Bernardi, 1975; Solovay, 1976; Boolos, 1979; Smorynski, 1985) . Following G odel's procedure for numbering theorems of PA, a rst order \provability" predicate can be constructed. Once the unary predicate of provability is interpreted as a modal operator 2, according to Solovay's translation, the modal counterpart of the Diagonalization lemma holds for a restricted set of modal formulae as stated by the following condition:
p obeys the diagonalization restriction (D.R) in E(p) i p is boxed in E(p). Smorynski, in (Smorynski, 1985) On the basis of the above extensions the following holds:
The proof of the above result (see (Smorynski, 1985) ) amounts to the proof that xed points are implicitly and explicitly de nable in G. In fact, denoting, H(p) = s](E(p) p), the following holds.
{ Implicit De nability (ID) of xed points in G:
In addition, from ID, by Beth theorem and DiR (both holding in G) it follows: { Explicit De nability (ED) of xed points in G: there exists a sentence containing all the variables of E(p) other than p and such that:
The role of implicit de nability (ID) is to state uniqueness of xed points which is crucial for the Solovay's rst completeness theorem (Solovay, 1976) , showing that G is the logic of provability, i.e. a modal sentence is a theorem of G if all its translations are theorems of PA. On the other hand, for this very reason of uniqueness, it is not possible to state, from a theory in the logic G, that \a sentence p is consistent", i.e. 3p, because it would lead to the inconsistency of G. Therefore, no possible self-reference to the context, required to mention consistency, can be carried out in G. Observe that, instead, this is always possible in KD4Z. The role played by the implicit consistency predicate is thus clear: in fact, for example, the G odel sentence` ' :Pr(d'e), in which E(p) = :2p is not de nable when is KD4Z.
On the other hand the second completeness theorem of Solovay shows that G is the modal logic whose theorems are precisely those modal sentences of which all translations are true in PA standard model. Where G is obtained from G by dropping the necessitation rule and adding re exivity, i.e. 2A ! A. Therefore 3> is a theorem of G while 23> is not (Solovay, 1976; Boolos, 1979 ).
The upshot is that in any logic in which PA is expressible the two schematà À 2A and 2A ! A are incompatible, which has been in fact investigated by
Montague (Montague, 1963) . These results should be compared with the use, in nonmonotonic modal logic, of the schema T together with the rule of necessitation. It seems clear that none of these logics obtained by these additions can capture self-reference (see Section 7 for a discussion). On the other hand, the failure of uniqueness of xed points in KD4Z should be interpreted as a sign of a more expressive power than G. In fact, consistency can be expressed in KD4Z.
Self reference in quanti ed modal logic
A natural question to be answered is whether, by extending the language to a rst order one, self-reference is still characterizable in the appropriate way. An answer to this question for the quanti ed modal logic G (QG) has been given by Montagna in (Montagna, 1984) and by Smorynski in (Smorynski, 1987) .
We shall discuss Smorynski's results on de nability for QG and some of his counterexamples, and give a simple case for quanti ed KD4Z.
Let us preserve from the propositional calculus a propositional letter, say p, that we shall use as a parameter to name contexts, the propositional connectives, the truth values (> and ?) and the modal operators. The quanti ed modal language QL we are concerned with is obtained by adding to the above propositional constructs and symbols an in nite set of variables and n-ary predicate symbols, and the quanti ers 8 and 9. Let us call QKD4Z (resp. QG) the extension of propositional KD4Z (resp. G) with the instances of axioms of the predicate calculus in the above de ned language.
Let us now add to QKD4Z (resp. QG) the Barcan formula:
that is the syntactic counterpart of models with constant domains. The converse of the Barcan formula:
is derivable in QG (see (Smorynski, 1987) ) as well as in QKD4Z.
The di culty of de nability of xed points in quanti ed modal logic stems mainly from the interplay between variables and modal operators. In the case quanti ers cannot be pushed against the 2, notwithstanding the Barcan formula, there are counterexamples to the de nability of xed points. In Smorynski the following counterexample is given, among others: We illustrate the claim as follows:
Example 4 Let A(p) = 3p^8x(22P(x) ! (p ! 2P (x))). De ne the terminal cluster as j = P(0); P(1); P(2), w 2 j = :P(0); P(1); P(2), w 1 j = P(0); :P(1), w 1 j = P(2), and w 0 j = P(0); P(1); :P(2). Therefore w 0 6 j = p where p = 8x(22P(x) ! 2P(x)) and w 0 j = p false while, in w 0 the following are all satis ed: 3p^8x(22P(x) ! (p ! 2P(x))), 3p^8x(22P(x) ! (false ! 2P(x))) and 3p^8x(22P(x) ! true).
Smorynski discusses also the cases which, with the Barcan formula, do not offer counterexamples to de nability. In particular, interpreting the multimodal logic SR n (see Chapter 4 of (Smorynski, 1985) ) into QG + B it is possible to show that for any propositional combination of formulae of the form Q 1 x 1 : : : Q k x k 2B, in which quanti ers are pushed against the box, explicit de nability can be given.
Analogously, we show that for some restricted class of formulae of the quanti ed modal language, the First Substitution Lemma holds (FSL, see the Appendix Observe that if E(p) is decomposable as above, obviously the Barcan formula is useless. Both the Barcan formula and its converse may be needed just to get the decomposition. Therefore Theorem 4, i.e. the de nability of predicates of the form 2C(p), can be analogously given for formulae of QKD4Z in the restricted form de ned above.
Example 5 Consider the following cases:
{ Let E(p) = 2(p ! 8x(P(x) ! Q(x)))^2(p^P(a) _ P(b)); then E(p) = E(2C 1 (p); 2C 2 (p)), where E(q 1 ; q 2 ) = q 1^q2 , 2C 1 (p) = 2(p ! (8xP (x) ! Q(x))) and 2C 2 (p) = 2(p^P(a) _ P(b)). 2C 1 (>) = 2(8xP(x) ! Q(x)), 2C 2 (>) = 2(P(a) _ P(b)) and E(>) = 2(8xP(x) ! Q(x))^2(P(a) _ P(b)). { Let E(p) = 8x2(p^P(x)), then, by B and its converse E(p) 28x(pP (x) ), E(p) = E(2C(p)), where 2C(p) = 2(p^8xP(x)). { If E(p) = 8x(Q(x) _ 2(p ! P(x)), then it has no good decomposition.
We can observe that the example of the Introduction is, in fact, analogous to the rst case above.
5 Self Reference in nonmonotonic logic: the case of Default logic
We have shown that xed points are explicitly de nable in KD4Z. In this section we show that a default theory yields the de nition of a modal predicate that has xed points corresponding to an e ective translation of its extensions. Let hW; Di be a default theory, where W is nitely axiomatizable and D is a nite set of default rules each of the form = : = ; is called the prerequisite, the justi cation and the conclusion of the default. We assume the reader familiar with Reiter's default logic, we refer to (Reiter, 1980) and to for the basic formalisms and the most signi cant results. Let p be a propositional parameter, denoting the context. We de ne the translation of a default theory into the modal logic KD4Z as follows:
Tr hW;Di (p) = 2(3p^W^^ 2D tr (p)) (15) Observe that 3p, under the outermost 2, commits the contest to be consistent.
In addition, we de ne a stability condition St hW;Di which singles out the set J D of justi cations of the defaults in D maximally consistent with the parameter theory p as:
In the following we shall drop the subscript both in Tr hW;Di (p) and St hW;Di (p) when no confusion arises.
The xed point equation becomes therefore p (T r(p)^St(p)) (17) which is equivalent to (p Tr(p))^St(p) (18) by de nition of St(p).
In the sequel we sometimes identify (T r(p)^St(p)) with E(p). We call the solutions to the xed point equation (18) saturated xed points. Namely, a saturated xed point T satis es:
Since p is not boxed in St(p), the theorems of Section 4 cannot be applied directly to E(p). Nevertheless, the fact that the xed point equation is equivalent to (p Tr(p))^St(p) allows the computation of xed points, notwithstanding the fact that in the general case a formula may have di erent decompositions and the computation of T may be rather complex. The set of saturated xed points is thus a subset of the set of xed points of Tr. Furthermore, we may use the \guess-and-check" method for computing xed points (similar to )): we rst look for candidates T by exploiting Theorem 6 applied to Tr(p) and then check whether St(T ) holds. This will be explained in more details below.
Once a theory T is uniformly substituted for p in the self-referential sentence p E(p) the rst sentence Tr checks whether there exists a succession of defaults whose modal translations are closed in T ; the second sentence St checks for the saturation of the application of the whole set of defaults D.
The xed point equation (19) states that the logical content of T is exactly circumscribed by the two conditions Tr and St. We can now introduce both a provability and a consistency operator for default logic. We de ne the provability operator Pr T (') for default logic as 2(T ! 2') and the consistency operator Con T (') as 2(T^3'). Note that a xed point solution T for E(p) is of \necessary force", that is`K D4Z T ! 2T , then T`K D4Z Pr T (') if and only if T`K D4Z 22'. In the following T denotes the set of modal-free formulae such that T`K D4Z 22 . (Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1988; . Theorem 7 b), whose proof is that of Proposition 11 in { Theorem 7 applies to obtain Reiter extensions. Since we are interested in the reduction of the xed points to the modal-free language by means of the operator , it is su cient to consider only those s which are justications of defaults of hW; Di. A consistent saturated xed point, if any, is obtained from a xed point T of Tr hW;Di (p) by putting in logical conjunction Tr hW;Di (>) with a certain set of formulae 23 ( must be consistent with T ). If it is consistent and still equivalent to T , then it corresponds to a consistent Reiter extension via the reduction performed by the operator .
Examples
We now show some examples to illustrate how to check for xed points for Reiter extensions, along the lines of the given results. Observe that we shall give all the paradigmatic examples, so that any other (e.g. the one given in the Introduction) can be easily reduced to the following ones. The above examples seem to bring lots of machinery into the computation of Reiter extensions. Observe however that these computations can be completely automated, since KD4Z is decidable and tableaux for the logic are available.
7 Discussion on the related Literature
We have argued that much of commonsense reasoning concerns the de nition of concepts, and that this is, in fact, a central theme in nonmonotonic reasoning.
Nonmonotonic reasoning provides the su cient conditions in the de nition of concepts by relativizing it to the context, which accounts for some selfreferential statement such as \It is consistent to assume, in the context p, that is 1 ; : : : ; k ". However, strong (functional) de nability like in G or rst order logic cannot account for the above notions.
This form of relativization to the context is often carried out, in the literature on nonmonotonic reasoning, by binding commonsense statements to the belief set of an agent. So that the self-referential ability is lifted from the commonsense language to one in which two distinct (or even more) levels of reasoning are formulated.
These approaches are based on two paradigms, which we call the preference paradigm and, according to Marek and Truszczynski, the negation as failure to prove paradigm.
The preference paradigm (Halpern and Moses, 1988; Lin and Shoham, 1990; Besnard and Schaub, 1992) , de nes a preference relation among modal structures which are sets of classical interpretations. Preference criteria for default reasoning were introduced by Doyle in (Doyle, 1983) and Etherington (Etherington, 1988) . Lin and Shoham (Lin and Shoham, 1990 ) use a bimodal logic to provide a semantical characterization of default logics by means of preferred modal models.
The xed point paradigm is based on the following idea: \Find a solution (i.e.
a -expansion) to the equation ? = Cn (I f3 : : 6 2 ?g", where I is a translation of the defaults in the modal logic .
In particular the above schema has been introduced by the early work of McDermott and Doyle (see (McDermott and Doyle, 1980; McDermott, 1982) ), further developed by Stalnaker in an unpublished manuscript of 1980, appeared later in (Stalnaker, 1993) , with the introduction of the notion of stable set, and afterwards expanded by Moore in (Moore, 1985) . The connection with default logic has been proposed by the work of Konolige (Konolige, 1988) and further developed in (Marek and Truszczynski, 1990 ).
Marek and Truszczynski (Truszczynski, 1991; have shown that with the negation as failure to prove paradigm a family of modal logics can be devised to capture default reasoning. In fact, -expansions with in this family of modal logics are stable sets of ground theories ? which turn out to be Reiter extensions. Indeed, Marek, Truszczynski and Schwartz have established more general results showing that Doyle and McDermott's xed point is so powerful to yield in nitely many nonequivalent nonmonotonic modal logics, by varying the choice of the underlying monotonic modal logic (Schwarz, 1995) . Among these KD45 , Sw5, S4f, S4:2 and S4:3 have been widely studied and proposed as good candidates for representing knowledge and belief. A strong argument in favor of them is that they are maximal (Schwarz, 1991; Schwarz, 92; Schwarz and Truszczynski, 1992; Schwarz, 1995) and even the largest in their range (Schwarz, 1995) (i.e. in the class of modal logics which generate the same nonmonotonic modal logic).
Recently (Amati et al., 1996a) introduced boxed nonmonotonic modal logics, that is logics enjoying an alternative xed point construction; for these logics the schema (3) of page 4 is rede ned by means of boxed contexts. Boxed expansions are thus generated by a the set equation which is called boxed xed point. The underlying idea is to interpret the membership relation of a formula to the context T as a nonmonotonic provability operator.
In general, modal logic is used to this purpose, belief and knowledge are treated as two modalities, and the agent can also de ne autoepistemic truths, i.e. sentences containing occurrences of K and B that refer to the agent's knowledge itself. In what way K and B should be clearly distinguished is however a controversial matter.
For example, Schwartz and Truszczynski (Schwarz and Truszczynski, 1994) consider the logics of minimal knowledge of Halpern and Moses (Halpern and Moses, 1988) more suitable for describing knowledge sets of an agent than the autoepistemic logic of Moore or Levesque's \only knowing" logics (Levesque, 1990) . For example, if 2 is a modality standing for either B or K and the agent initial assumption is I = f2p ! pg, then p belongs to the belief set when using
Moore's autoepistemic logic (Moore, 1985) , while Halpern and Moses's logics reject p as a plausible conclusion. Analogously, if the agent's belief is just f2pg, then it is argued that p should be a plausible conclusion, but when 2 is used as a belief operator, p may be actually false, even though believed. Indeed, an implicit requirement for a knowledge operator K is to avoid forming a knowledge set containing p whenever the agent belief is fKp ! pg, since this last axiom schema must in some way be considered tautological. This remark yields an apparent paradox if one compares it with the valid reasoning schemata of G, in which the modal operator can be regarded as an extremely strong form of the knowledge operator, to the extent that what is known by the system is e ectively provable. Contrary to our intuition, from the validity of f2p ! pg it follows that p is a theorem (by the L ob rule). As a consequence, theories containing sentences of the form :2' cannot be considered in G, thus denying the possibility of using G as a logical basis for any form of negative introspection. This fact is a consequence of the well known result about the incompleteness of rst order logic in the language of arithmetic; provability and truth run on two di erent tracks. This limiting result causes unrecoverable drawbacks to the possibility of distinguishing beliefs from knowledge: if the agent's knowledge is intended as a set of true beliefs and a suitable notion of truth can be given only at the intentional or \external" level, then the question of which modal logics are appropriate to represent knowledge and beliefs may become an eternally arguable question.
Another approach, to maintaining a self-referential ability in the language, is taken by quoting sentences referring to themselves in the language. This amounts to dealing with some analogue of the L ob derivability conditions
where Bel is a predicate standing for the modal operator B, and d e is a suitable quotation of the sentence . However, the di culties caused by unquoting quoted statements, through substitutions in rst order logic languages have been investigated by Montague in (Montague, 1963) who thus argued in favor of modal logic. In contrast to Montague's thesis, Perlis in (Perlis, 1985; Perlis, 1988) argues that modal logics are on no rmer ground than rst order logic when equally endowed with substitutive self-reference. Perlis introduces a suitable notion of substitution of a name dpe for its expression p in formulae (providing a similar expressiveness of the g odelian numbering function in the arithmetic language). A function symbol sub(dPe; dQe; d e) of substitution is supplied (sub(dP e; dQe; d e) = S holds if S is the name for the term obtained as the result of naming the substitution in P of dQe for all occurrences of d e). Perlis suggests that for an intelligent reasoner such self-referential languages are desirable but, essentially, only limiting results are reported.
In this paper we have shown that in the modal logic KD4Z, we can postulate a weaker notion of de nability, admitting several xed points to the selfreferential sentence p E(p), and therefore KD4Z admits a class of modal predicates expressing the provability of consistency. Finally we have addressed how to solve the problem of representing self-reference as an internal construction, thus giving a solution to the problem of representing explicit de nability.
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Proposition 4 Let C(p) be a formula with p propositional variable. Then (Nec, K and Ax. 4 
KD4Z E(B(>)) E(E(B(>)))
The proof is as in Smorynski (Smorynski, 1985) , where C(p) is C(B(p)). 2 Proposition 6 Let p be boxed in E(p) and let q be a new variable. Then:
1.`K D4Z 2(p q) ! (E(p) E(q)) 2.`K D4Z s](E(p) p)^ s](E(q) q) ! (2(p q) ! (p q)) 3.`K D4Z s](E(p) p)^ s](E(q) q) ! (32(p q) ! (p q))
The proofs of 1 and 2 are as in Smorynski (Smorynski, 1985) . (ii)`K D4Z 2(E(p) p)^2(E(q) q) ! 2(2(p q) ! (p q)) (FORL) (iii)`K D4Z 2(E(p) p)^2(E(q) q) ! (32(p q) ! 2(p q)) (Z) (iv)`K D4Z 2(E(p) p)^2(E(q) q) ! (32(p q) ! (p q)) . By inductive hypothesis we have T`K D4Z 22 hence, from`K D4Z T ! 23 ^(22 ! 22 , from Proposition 10, we have`K D4Z T ! 22 ), hence 2 T . By Proposition 3.26 of 
